The overhead caused by broadcast schemes cannot be neglected in mobile ad hoc networks. It is known that the probabilistic broadcast scheme is an effective approach to reduce overhead, in which nodes forward packets with a probability to reduce redundant retransmissions. In hostile environments, malicious nodes degrade network efficiency, and they should be prevented from route discovery and data transmission. In this case, routing packets forwarded by malicious nodes are redundant. This paper presents a Trust-based Probabilistic Broadcast scheme (TPB) focusing on reducing overhead, especially caused by malicious nodes, in which rebroadcast probability is determined based on nodes' trustworthiness. In order to obtain nodes' trust level, a light-weight trust management model is designed based on direct and recommended trust evidence. According to nodes' trust level, rebroadcast delay is calculated for rearranging the rebroadcast order of routing packets. Furthermore, a novel method based on nodes' trustworthiness is proposed to calculate rebroadcast probability, which prevents untrusted nodes from route discovery. The proposed trustbased probabilistic broadcast scheme is incorporated with existing routing protocol and its performance is evaluated by simulations. The numerical results show that the proposed scheme can secure network communication and reduce the routing overhead.
value or adaptively determined based on local or global parameters, such as nodes density, mobility level, remaining energy, distance, etc. [4] , [9] . However, all these schemes do not take into consideration the trustworthiness of nodes [10] . In this case, if nodes misbehave and do not cooperate to forward packets based on the predefined probability, the dieout problem [11] can frequently occur. On the other hand, these malicious nodes may damage network connections by launching various attacks [12] . If routes contain malicious nodes, the network performance will be degraded. Therefore, it is essential to consider the trustworthiness of nodes in route discovery.
The RREQ packet is usually used in route discovery. In fact, the route is always the one propagation path of the RREQ packet from the source to the destination. Since malicious nodes degrade the network efficiency, they should be prevented from route discovery and data transmission. In this case, routing packets forwarded by malicious nodes are redundant. In order to reduce the overhead, especially caused by malicious nodes in MANET, we propose a novel Trustbased Probabilistic Broadcast scheme (TPB), which takes nodes' trustworthiness as a key element to calculate rebroadcast probability. Nodes with lower trust level have a lower probability in route discovery. TPB scheme has the following benefits: 1) The trust-based probabilistic broadcast scheme decreases the number of redundant rebroadcasting packets caused by malicious nodes, so that corresponding wireless communication resources are released for data transmission;
2) The probability of malicious nodes participating in route discovery is reduced in route discovery phase, so that the trustworthiness of route is improved. These benefits reduce the adverse impact of malicious nodes on network communication. To the best of our knowledge, this trust-based probabilistic broadcast scheme is the first time to be proposed in this area.
The main contributions of this paper include 1) A light-weight trust management model is employed to evaluate the trustworthiness of nodes by combining direct and recommended trust evidence. The weight coefficient is dynamically calculated with a novel method to improve evaluation accuracy especially in the case of suffering from data sparsity problem.
2) RREQ selection mechanism based on rebroadcast delay is proposed, in which rebroadcast delay is calculated based on the trustworthiness of nodes. A node is allowed to receive several copies of RREQ packets and select one to forward.
3) A trust-based method is developed for the calculation of rebroadcast probability. The method considers the trustworthiness of both the previous relay node and the uncovered neighbors. A higher trust level leads to a higher rebroadcast probability.
TPB scheme is different from traditional trust-based routing schemes [13] , [14] . TPB prevents malicious nodes from route discovery. However, the traditional trust-based routing schemes do not consider nodes' trustworthiness in the RREQ delivery phase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the related work. In Section III, the proposed trustbased probabilistic broadcast scheme for mobile ad hoc networks is described in detail. The performance evaluation is discussed in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The broadcast scheme is one of the important mechanisms in mobile ad hoc networks [3] , [4] . A straightforward way to implement broadcasting is blind flooding [15] , in which every node rebroadcasts packets whenever it receives a fresh one. However, blind flooding produces redundant transmissions and may cause the broadcast storm problem [7] .
Many efficient broadcast schemes are proposed in recent years. In [16] [17] [18] , only several selected relay nodes are allowed to rebroadcast packets, so that the number of redundant transmissions is reduced. To achieve this, dominant pruning is proposed to reduce the total number of relay nodes, in which 2-hop neighbor information is utilized in the selection of relay nodes. However, its difficulty is to obtain the up-to-date 2-hop neighbor knowledge in highly dynamic networks. Reference [19] propose a bi-directional stable communication relay nodes selection scheme (BDSC) for multi-hop broadcasting protocols, where relay nodes are selected based on the estimated link qualities and the distance between the source broadcaster and the potential forwarders. However, failure to receive broadcast packets by a relay node can greatly affect the reliability of the broadcast scheme. To overcome such a problem, reference [20] proposed a method to select some additional relay node, so as to cover 2-hop relay nodes m times. Consequently, the reliability of packet delivery is further improved. Connected Dominating Set (CDS) [21] is another method to select relay nodes. CDS is the virtual backbone of ad hoc networks that can be constructed by global or local topology information. However, the problem of finding a minimum CDS is NP-complete in these deterministic schemes.
Probabilistic broadcast is another method to reduce the number of nodes participating in broadcasting, in which every node rebroadcasts the received packets with a given probability. GOSSIP [22] is a simple probabilistic broadcast scheme, in which all nodes rebroadcast the first incoming packets with the same fixed probability. The authors expanded the GOSSIP and proposed a new scheme named GOSSIP(p, K ) [11] to enhance network connectivity. The improvement is that the nodes in the first k hops of the source node rebroadcast the packets with a probability equal to 1.
Other than a fixed value, the rebroadcast probability can also be determined adaptively based on the local or global network parameters. In [23] , the uncovered neighbor set is considered. The obtained probability is proportional to the size of the uncovered neighbor set, so as to reach more additional neighbor nodes by one retransmission. In [24] , a neighbor coverage-based probabilistic broadcast scheme is proposed for reducing control overhead in mobile ad hoc networks. The scheme calculates the rebroadcast probability with consideration of both the number of retransmissions and network connectivity by combining the additional coverage ratio and connectivity factor. To obtain additional neighbor coverage ratio, authors further rearrange the broadcast order according to rebroadcast delay. Distance information is also used as a parameter in determining the rebroadcast probability [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] . In [26] , [27] , Euclidean distance is adopted to calculate the rebroadcast probability. Rebroadcast probability is generally proportional to the Euclidean distance to avoid redundant retransmissions. However, the disadvantage of Euclidean distance is the need for a positioning system. In [28] , authors demonstrated that the Jaccard distance could be used to estimate the Euclidean distance between two nodes without the help of the positioning system. Based on the Jaccard distance, probabilistic broadcast schemes are proposed to improve the discovery phase of reactive ad hoc routing protocols. Both schemes determine rebroadcast probability as a function of the Jaccard distance. Other than neighbor information [23] , [24] , [30] , node density [30] , [31] , mobility level [32] and remain energy [4] are also used to derive rebroadcast probability.
The existing broadcast schemes work effectively based on the collaboration between nodes. No literature has taken node trustworthiness into consideration when determining rebroadcast probability. However, a node may act maliciously due to the characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks such as resource constraints and limited physical protection [33] . Malicious nodes can destroy the effectiveness of the probabilistic broadcast mechanism. To alleviate this problem, the trust level of nodes is taken into account as a critical parameter in the calculation of rebroadcast probability for mobile nodes in hostile environments.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
A. OVERVIEW TPB scheme contains three main components: trust management model, RREQ selection and rebroadcast probability calculation. As shown in Figure 1 , the trust management model is responsible for evaluating the trustworthiness of nodes. It provides trust information for other components. In the RREQ selection component, a node is allowed to receive several copies of a RREQ before performing rebroadcast operation. Each copy is assigned a broadcast delay timer based on the trust level of the packet's sending node. Only the packet whose timer is first expired obtains the qualification to be forwarded. Consequently, the rebroadcast order of RREQs is rearranged. In the rebroadcast probability calculation component, nodes calculate rebroadcast probability according to the trust information of neighbors, and rebroadcast the selected RREQ according to the obtained rebroadcast probability.
B. LIGHT-WEIGHT TRUST MANAGEMENT MODEL
This paper only considers the packet forwarding phase attacks, including packet-dropping attack and modification attack.
• Packet-dropping attack: a node may drop packets passing through it to ruin network communication. Since nodes may not forward routing packets in probabilisticbroadcast-based route discovery, only data packet dropping is considered in this paper.
• Modification attack: a node may illegally modify the packet passing through it including data packet and control packet. To cope with the above adversary attack model, we design a light-weight trust management model according to existing modes [13] , [14] , [34] [35] [36] [37] . The proposed model derives nodes' trust level based on two types of trust, direct trust from direct observations and indirect trust recommended by the third node. In order to collect trust evidence, mobile nodes should be able to operate in so-called promiscuous mode, so that the sender node could overhead the retransmission of any packets by the recipient node [38] . The main components are illustrated in Figure 2 .
The trust evaluation is made periodically with a predefined interval time. Trust in MANETs is the opinion held by one node (known as evaluating node) about another node (known as evaluated node), based on nodes' historical behaviors. To accumulate trust evidence obtained in different periods, the Bayesian statistical approach is deployed to evaluate direct trust, which is assumed to follow a beta probability distribution f (p|α, β).
where () is Gamma function, a and β are the super-parameters to control the distribution shape. In the trust management model, we use α ij to represent the number of positive observations (normal data packet forwarding) the evaluating node i hold on the evaluated node j, and β ij represents the number of negative observations, including data packet dropping or illegal modification. The direct trust node i hold on j can be computed from these parameters as the expectation of beta distribution:
The importance of evidence changes over time. Observations obtained in early time have less influence on the evaluation results. To achieve this, a decay factor, denoted as µ, is used to decrease the influence of previous evidence. Suppose that the positive observations and negative observations in the previous period are denoted as α old ij and β old ij , and the positive observations and negative observations in the current period are α new ij and β new ij , respectively. Then, the value of α ij and β ij is updated respectively as:
The evaluating node may suffer from data sparsity problem [39] , which is occurred when there is no or insufficient communications between neighbor nodes. In such cases, the evaluating node lacks interaction experience and it is difficult to accurately evaluate trust level. Indirect trust can be used to alleviate this problem [39] , [40] . Indirect trust is recommended by the third nodes and can be used by evaluating node as second-hand trust evidence. By collecting indirect trust from the recommenders around the evaluated node, the evaluating node has more trust evidence to improve the evaluation result. Suppose node i is evaluating the trustworthiness of node j, T kj stands for the recommended trust node k holds on node j, the indirect trust T r ij is calculated by
where C n is the node set which are both neighbors of node i and j, | · | represents the number of nodes in a set. The final trust node i hold on j is obtained by combining the direct and the indirect trust with weights, denoted as w d and w r , respectively:
where w d + w r = 1. Unlike other trust models using a fixed weight coefficient [40] , the proposed model assigns weights dynamically according to the number of interactions observed by the evaluating node. If enough interactions are observed, the direct observation is more important to the establishment of trust relationship. However, the lack of interaction experience makes it difficult for the evaluating node to judge the trustworthiness of the evaluated node. Thus, more weight given to the indirect trust can improve the evaluation result. To achieve this, we design a novel dynamic weight coefficient setting method. The weights are calculated adaptively according to the number of direct interactions by
where w con , that is a constant weight value ranging from (0, 1], denotes the maximum weight of direct trust, σ is a predefined threshold and n (n = α ij +β ij ) is the number of the interactions. The threshold σ denotes whether the evaluating node has enough interactions with the evaluated node or not. Thus, if n is equal to 0, w d is 0. With the increase of n, w d becomes large. When n is larger than σ , the value of w d is close or equal to w con . Figure 3 illustrates the change of weights with different interaction experience.
C. RREQ SELECTION
In the on-demand routing protocol, the RREQ packet is designed to discover routes in MANET. Routing protocol broadcasts RREQs, which will be propagated in the network. When a RREQ is firstly received, the node rebroadcasts it to its neighbors. The duplicated RREQs will be discarded directly instead of being rebroadcasted. In fact, the route is the propagation path of the RREQ. However, the propagation path is out of control in traditional routing protocols. For example, whether the previous relay node is a malicious node is not considered. For a source node, it does not want to establish a route based upon a RREQ forwarded by untrusted nodes, because such nodes may threaten the network communication. Thus, rebroadcasting the RREQs received from untrusted nodes is redundant. A novel rebroadcast mechanism is designed to reduce the probability that untrusted nodes participate in forwarding RREQs. The proposed rebroadcast mechanism, which consists of two strategies, rearranges the forwarding order of RREQs propagated by different paths according to the trustworthiness of the previous relay nodes. The first strategy assigns a rebroadcast delay for RREQs. When node i receives a RREQ from its neighbor j (denoted as RREQ ij ), it calculates a rebroadcast delay FD ij according to the trustworthiness T ij node i holds on j:
where MaxDelay is the predefined maximum rebroadcast delay. The higher the trustworthiness of the previous node i is, the smaller the rebroadcast delay is assigned for RREQ ij . Node i starts a timer for RREQ ij , and does not perform rebroadcast operation until any timer expires.
The second strategy allows a node to receive and hold duplicated copies of a RREQ. When receiving a RREQ ij though a new propagation path, node i processes it as follows:
Step 1: If node i has forwarded a duplicated one, the newly received RREQ ij will be discarded directly. Otherwise, go to Step2.
Step 2: Node i calculates rebroadcast delay for the RREQ ij using (7) .
Step 3: If the timer of any RREQ saved by node i is expired, node i rebroadcasts it and clears duplicated RREQs.
Setting different rebroadcast delay for duplicated RREQs is based on the following reasons: firstly, it gives a node time to receive more RREQs from different propagation paths, thus, the node is able to select a most suitable one to forward; secondly, the rebroadcast delay of a RREQ is inversely proportional to the trust level of the previous relay node, so, the RREQ forwarded by trusted node has higher priority to be rebroadcasted again. As a result, the probability that the RREQ is forwarded to the destination by trusted nodes is increased, and the security of the route can be improved.
Taking Figure 4 as an example to further explain the effect of rebroadcast delay. As shown in Figure 4 , node d receives three copies of a RREQ from nodes a, b and c at time t + 0.1ms, t + 0.2ms and t + 0.3ms, respectively. According to the trust value of nodes a (0.5), b (0.7) and c (0.9), node d sets rebroadcast delay 5ms, 3ms and 1ms for the three RREQs, respectively. So, the RREQs from nodes a, b and c are expected to be rebroadcasted at time t + 5.1ms, t + 3.2ms and t + 1.3ms, respectively. Although node d is allowed to receive more than one copy of a RREQ, it can rebroadcast only one of them. Thus, the RREQ received from node c, which timer first expires, is rebroadcasted. Other RREQs are discarded. Although the RREQ from node a first reaches node d, the one received from node c which has the highest trust value is rebroadcasted. The strategy of rebroadcast delay increases the probability that the route consists of trusted nodes in the route discovery phase.
D. REBROADCAST PROBABILITY
Since untrusted nodes are not the desired nodes to establish routes, the routing packets related to such untrusted nodes are certainly redundant. In order to reduce such redundant packets, the trustworthiness of nodes needs to be taken into account in the process of determining the rebroadcast probability.
When node i receives a RREQ from node j, parts of i's neighbors (both neighbors of i and j) also receive a copy and the others still cannot be covered. We use UnCovered Neighbors (UCN) set to quantify those uncovered nodes ( Figure 5 shows an illustration). The UCN set of node i (denoted as U (i)) is expressed as
where N b (i) and N b (j) denote the neighbors of node i and j, respectively. Some nodes in the UCN set can also receive RREQ from other nodes. Thus, the UCN set should be adjusted dynamically. When node i receives a duplicated RREQ from node k in its UCN set, U (i) is updated by: In a hostile environment containing malicious nodes, whether a node rebroadcasts a RREQ is partly determined by the recipient node. If the recipient node has a lower trust level, the rebroadcast operation will be useless for route discovery. Thus, the trustworthiness of nodes in the UCN set should be considered when determining the rebroadcast probability for a RREQ. To achieve this, we define the trustworthiness of UCN set (TU (i)), the value of which is equal to the trust value of the node that has the largest trust value in the UCN set:
However, if the UCN set of node i is empty, TU (i) is 0. Based on the trustworthiness of UCN set, node i calculates rebroadcast probability:
The rebroadcast probability is determined by the trustworthiness of the previous relay node and the UCN set, which is equal to the smaller trust value of the two. Rebroadcast probability is determined by a simple principle: whether forwarding a RREQ contributes to the establishment of trusted routes or not. If the previous relay node has a higher trust level or any node in the UCN set has a higher trust level, the RREQ is worthy to be rebroadcast again, and thus has a higher probability to be forwarded to the destination by trusted nodes.
E. EXAMPLE OF TPB-BASED ROUTE DISCOVERY
TPB scheme is able to optimize the route discovery protocol by improving RREQ delivery process based on the following two strategies: RREQ selection and trust-based probabilistic broadcast. Taking Figure 6 as an example of route discovery that the TPB scheme is incorporated into AODV protocol. It is assumed that the node trust level is evaluated and updated regularly. We can clearly see that source node s discovers its routes to destination node d at time t by broadcasting RREQ. For an illustrative purpose, the transmission and processing time of RREQ and channel conflict are not considered here, thus both nodes a and b receive a copy of the RREQ from s at time t, respectively. It can be seen that the rebroadcast delay FD as for node a can be calculated by FD as = MaxDelay × (1−T as ) = 10 × (1-1) = 0, w con can be calculated by w con = max(0.6, 0.9) = 0.9, and the rebroadcast probability p re (a) is calculated by p re (a) = min(T U (a) , T as ) = min(0.9,1) = 0.9. In this case, node a can forward RREQ as at time t with a probability 0.9. Similarly, node b calculates related parameters and forwards RREQ bs at time t + 0.5 with a probability 0.9. Likewise, node b is also able to forward its RREQ with an estimated probability. Hence, node e receives RREQ ea and RREQ eb from nodes a and b, respectively. Node e selects RREQ eb to forward at time t + 1 with a probability 0.95 and drops RREQ ea since the delay time of RREQ eb is smaller than RREQ ea . Note that node c receives RREQ ca and RREQ ce from nodes a and e respectively as well. However, when node c selects RREQ ce and calculates its rebroadcast probability, it finds T U (c) = 0, because all its neighbors have received the same copy of RREQ. In this case, node c is not necessary to forward its RREQ at time t + 2. When destination d receives a RREQ from node e, it replies a RREP to node e. Therefore, source node s discovers a route to destination node d as s-b-e-d. If more than one route is found, then the route with the highest trust level is selected [13] .
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS

A. SIMULATION SETUP
The NS-2 simulator with a version of 2.33 is used as the platform to evaluate the performance of routing protocols. The proposed trust-based probabilistic broadcast scheme (TPB) is achieved by modifying the source code of Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing (AODV) protocol [5] . The modification is done with the following four aspects. Firstly, the light-weight trust level management model is integrated into AODV protocol, so that nodes can evaluate the trust level of their neighboring nodes. Secondly, a trust-based RREQ selection mechanism is used to replace the classic first-come-first-served forwarding approach upon receiving RREQ packets. Thirdly, nodes forward RREQ based on a trust probabilistic broadcast model. Finally, the format of RREQ and RREP packets are created of a new field to carry route trust information. The performance of TPB based protocol is compared with pure AODV, trust-based AODV (TAODV) [13] and Jaccard-distance-based probabilistic broadcast scheme (JLinear) [28] . In TAODV, if more than one path is available, the one with the highest route trust is selected. The route trust is equal to the trust of the node with the lowest trust level on the route. In order to facilitate comparison, the trust value used in TAODV is obtained by the trust model proposed in this paper. In JLinear, a node rebroadcasts the received routing packets with a probability that is equal to its Jaccard distance between the sender node.
In the simulations, mobile nodes are randomly placed in the fields of 1000m × 1000m. Every mobile node has a 250 meters transmission range and a wireless bandwidth of 2Mbps. All nodes move according to the random way-point mobility model (RWP) [41] , in which the moving speed is randomly selected from [0m/s, max-speed] and the pause time is set to 10 seconds. The simulation considers constant bit rate (CBR) data traffic between source-destination connections. Each source node sends five CBR packets with a size of 512 bytes per second. The MaxDelay is set to 0.01 seconds, which is equal to the default maximum jitter time of sending broadcast packets in the implementation of AODV in NS-2. Thus, the mechanism of rebroadcast delay does not produce extra delay in route discovery. The parameter w con in (6) is set to 0.8, considering that direct trust is more important than indirect trust for trust evaluation. The detailed simulation parameters are listed in TABLE 1.
In the simulation, mobile nodes are randomly selected as malicious nodes, which can launch a modification attack and a packet-dropping attack. In the modification attack, malicious nodes carry out attacks by illegally modifying variable filed information in data packet or routing packet with a probability between 0.2-0.4. In the packet-dropping attack, malicious nodes randomly discard received data packets with a probability between 0.3-0.6. We assume that malicious nodes devotedly forward routing packets with given broadcast probability. The ratio of modification and packet-dropping attack are 30% and 70%, respectively. The initial trust value of every node is 1, that is, the values of parameters α and β are initialized to 1 and 0, respectively.
The following four performance metrics are used to evaluate network performance:
Packet delivery ratio. It is the ratio of the number of data packets received by CBR destinations to the number of data packets generated by CBR sources.
Average rebroadcast ratio. It is the ratio of the number of nodes that rebroadcast the packets to the number of nodes that receive the broadcast packets.
Normalized routing overhead. It is defined as the ratio of the number of control packets (including RREQ, RREP, RERR, Hello packets and the packets carrying indirect trust) to the number of the data packets delivered to the destinations. When a control packet is retransmitted, it is counted as one transmission.
Average end-to-end delay. It is the average time needed to successfully deliver data packets from CBR sources to destinations.
Three types of simulations are conducted. Each one is designed to evaluate the impact of one of the following parameters on the network performance:
Number of malicious nodes. We vary the number of malicious nodes from 0 to 30% of mobile nodes to study the impact of malicious nodes on the network performance. In this type of simulation, the number of mobile nodes and CBR connections are set to 60 and 10, respectively.
Number of mobile nodes. We vary the number of mobile nodes from 40 to 100 to evaluate the impact of network density. In this type of simulation, the CBR connection is set to 10, and the number of malicious nodes is set to 20% of mobile nodes.
Number of CBR connections. The number of CBR connections is varied from 6 to 18 to evaluate the impact of network traffic. The number of mobile nodes is set to 60 and 20% of them are selected as malicious nodes.
The simulation time is set to 500 seconds. To decrease the disturbance of random error, each data point is the average result of 40 trials of simulation. The confidence level is 95%, and the confidence interval is shown as a vertical bar in the figures.
B. TRUST LEVEL DISTRIBUTION OF NODES
Complex attacks such as collusion and false recommendation are not considered by the specified adversary model. Therefore, the trust model is able to identify the behavior of nodes with limited errors that can be ignored in TPB. This paper focuses on the level of nodes' trustworthiness since it is used to determine rebroadcast probability. To examine nodes' trust level, 100 mobile nodes are deployed in the simulation, and 30 percent of them are randomly selected as malicious nodes. The trust value is updated with an interval of 30 seconds. Figure 7 shows the trust level of all nodes in a simulation when time is 300 seconds. According to the trust level, it can be noticed that mobile nodes are obviously divided into two categories: normal nodes and malicious nodes. The normal nodes obtain higher trust values, equal or close to 1. By contrast, the malicious nodes are identified by means of assigning lower trust values. Figure 8 illustrates the trust levels of a ''normal node'' (id: 2) and a ''malicious node'' (id: 30).
The trust values of both normal nodes and malicious nodes fluctuate with time. The reason is that ''normal node'' may drop packets due to the congestion and thus its trust level is affected. In contrast, ''malicious node'' launches attacks based on the probability, which results in different trust levels for malicious nodes at different times. Figure 9 shows all four protocols suffer a continual decrease in terms of packet delivery ratio as the number of malicious nodes increases. The reason is that malicious nodes could destroy data transmission by dropping or modifying data packets. Therefore, the existence of malicious nodes in mobile ad hoc networks has a bad effect on the packet delivery ratio. This can be evidenced in Figure 10 showing the average route trust level versus the number of malicious nodes. It can be seen that the lower route trust level indicates that the routes have more malicious nodes on average. In Figure 9 , both TPB and TAODV have a higher packet delivery ratio than pure AODV and JLinear under the same network conditions. The reason is that trust management model helps the two protocols establish trusted paths. In these two protocols, TPB achieves an obviously higher packet delivery ratio than TAODV. The improvement is mainly due to the difference between broadcast schemes in the two protocols. TPB adopts trust-based probabilistic broadcast scheme, in which some nodes especially untrusted nodes broadcast RREQ packets with a low probability. This enhances TPB to build routes with a higher trust level than TAODV. In contrast, although JLinear is a probabilistic broadcast scheme, it could not cope with malicious node. Therefore, the packet delivery ratio of JLinear is lower than TPB.
C. SIMULATION RESULTS
1) VARYING NUMBER OF MALICIOUS NODES
The average rebroadcast ratio with different malicious node density is shown in Figure 11 . We can notice that AODV and TAODV almost rebroadcast all received routing packets. In contrast, TPB and JLinear only rebroadcast parts of the routing packets. Since AODV and TAODV take blind flooding as its broadcast method, each node will rebroadcast the routing packets when first receives one. Consequently, the average rebroadcast ratio of the two protocols is almost equal to 100 percent. TPB disseminates routing packets according to a probabilistic broadcast scheme, where the rebroadcast probability is calculated based upon the trustworthiness of nodes. Thus, the more the malicious nodes are in the network, the lower the average rebroadcast probability becomes. Consequently, the average rebroadcast ratio decreases when increasing the number of malicious nodes. In contrast, JLinear keeps the rebroadcast ratio at about 55 percent. The reason is that the rebroadcast probability of Jlinear is calculated based on nodes' Jaccard distance, not on the number of malicious nodes. The rebroadcast ratio also influences the packet reachability, which is defined as the percentage of nodes receiving a given broadcast packet. As shown in Figure 12 , the reachability of AODV is almost 100 percent while that of JLinear is also above 92 percent. In contrast, the reachability for TPB decreases when its rebroadcast ratio decreases. However, nodes not receiving route packets have low trust levels because they are prevented from route discovery. Therefore, low reachability with TPB has less influence on route discovery.
In Figure 13 , the normalized routing overhead of AODV, TAODV and JLinear increase when increasing the number of malicious nodes. In contrast, the normalized routing overhead of TPB is slightly affected. Since malicious nodes do not attack route discovery, the number of malicious nodes almost has no effect on the number of control packets. However, the packet delivery ratio of AODV, TAODV and JLinear decrease when the number of malicious nodes increases as shown in Figure 9 . Thus, the normalized routing overhead shows an increasing trend. For TPB, both the packet delivery ratio and the control packets decrease when the number of malicious nodes increases, as a result, it can be observed that the normalized routing overhead is affected slightly. Figure 14 measures the average end-to-end delay with varying number of malicious nodes. The average end-to-end delay of all four protocols declines with the increase of malicious node number. Among the four protocols, TPB and JLinear have an obvious reduction in average delay. The reason is that the probabilistic broadcast scheme reduces the control packets. This can reduce collision which is a phenomenon in MANETs that more than one node tries to access the same wireless resource simultaneously.
2) VARYING NUMBER OF MOBILE NODES Figure 15 shows the packet delivery ratio with different network density. Compared with AODV and JLinear, TPB and TAODV significantly increase the packet delivery ratio in hostile network environments. The improvement is mainly due to the mechanism of trust-based routing discovery, which prevents untrusted nodes from participating in route discovery. As a result, TPB and TAODV could establish more trusted routes compared with AODV and JLinear. On the other hand, TPB reduces the control overhead by avoiding some redundant broadcast packets especially produced by malicious nodes. This also contributes to the improvement of the packet delivery ratio. Figure 16 measures the impact of the network density on the average rebroadcast ratio. As expected, the average rebroadcast ratio of AODV and TAODV is almost 100 percent under different network density, due to that the rebroadcast operation of blind flooding scheme is independent of network density. In contrast, JLinear and TPB could reduce the rebroadcast operation of routing packets by 45% and 20% on average, respectively. It can be noticed that this performance metric is not obviously impacted by the network density especially in the dense network. This is because the rebroadcast probability in TPB and JLinear is mainly decided by the ratio of malicious nodes and Jaccard distance, respectively. Figure 17 shows the impact of network density on the normalized routing overhead. We can notice that the normalized routing overhead of four protocols slightly increases when increasing network density. The main reason is that the overhead produced during the routing discovery is proportional to the number of mobile nodes. Since the average rebroadcast ratio of TPB is lower, which can be noticed in Figure 15 , TPB can significantly reduce the routing overhead in all network density conditions. In contrast, although the average rebroadcast ratio of JLinear is lower than TPB, the former protocol has a very low packet delivery ratio. Thus, the normalized routing overhead of JLinear is higher than TPB. Figure 18 shows the average end-to-end delay with different network density. The delay is obviously higher when the network density is sparse (the number of mobile nodes < 60) for all protocols. The reason is that it is difficult to discover routes in sparse networks. This phenomenon is relieved with an increase in network density. Under the same network conditions, the delay of AODV and TAODV is slightly higher than TPB and JLinear. The extra delay is mainly due to the difference between broadcast schemes, because blind flooding incurs more collisions and interferences, which consume time to retransmit packets in the MAC layer.
3) VARYING NUMBER OF CBR CONNECTIONS
The effect of traffic load on the packet delivery ratio is shown in Figure 19 . Since the data packets and control packets are transmitted through the same physical channel, the channel contention and collision will be more severe when increasing the traffic load. Thus, some data packets will be dropped when the queues of nodes are full. This can explain why the packet delivery ratio slightly decreases when increasing the number of CBR connections. Compared with AODV, TAODV and JLinear, TPB achieves the highest packet deliver ratio under different data traffic. One reason is that TPB considers the trustworthiness of the nodes in route discovery, and trusted routes secure the data transmission. Another reason is the adoption of probabilistic broadcast, which reduces the redundant control packets and releases more wireless resources for data transmission. Figure 20 measures the average rebroadcast ratio with different traffic load. As expected, the average rebroadcast ratio of AODV and TAODV is still equal to 100 percent. Since TPB and JLinear calculate rebroadcast probability according to the trustworthiness of nodes and Jaccard distance respectively, the average rebroadcast ratio of them is not affected by the traffic load. Figure 21 shows that the traffic load has a slightly adverse impact on the normalized routing overhead. When traffic load increases, more data packets are dropped as shown in Figure 19 , due to the collisions and channel contention caused by a high congestion level. This leads to a slight increase in the normalized routing overhead. Since the packet delivery ratio of TPB is higher and the packet rebroadcast ratio of TPB is lower than the other protocols, we can know that TPB successfully transmits more data packets and produces less control packet under the same network conditions. However, TPB still gains a lower normalized routing overhead. Figure 22 measures the average end-to-end delay with different traffic load. When increasing the number of CBR connections, more data packets are simultaneously transmitted in the network. This incurs more collisions and interferences, which lead to an increase in delay. Compared with AODV and TAODV, TPB produces a slightly lower delay. The improvement is mainly contributed to the use of the trustbased probabilistic broadcast scheme, which could obviously reduce the redundant rebroadcast as shown in Figure 20 . Similarly, JLinear has the lowest end-to-end delay among the four protocols due to that it transmits fewer packets including routing packet and data packets.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a Trust-based Probabilistic Broadcast scheme (TPB) to secure network communication in hostile network environments. We first designed a lightweight trust management model to evaluate node trustworthiness, based on historical interactions between nodes.
Then we proposed a method based on nodes' trustworthiness to calculate rebroadcast delay, which is used to determine the forwarding order of routing packets and thus promote them to be forwarded by trusted nodes. We also considered nodes' trustworthiness when calculating rebroadcast probability in order to prevent untrusted nodes from participating in route discovery. These strategies provide TPB scheme the ability to discover trusted routes with less routing overhead. Simulation results show that TPB based protocol can achieve a significantly higher packet delivery ratio and an obviously lower normalized routing overhead, compared with blind flooding based protocols. The improvements prove that TPB scheme can filter out untrusted nodes and alleviate the damage from them, meanwhile, reducing the routing overhead caused by them.
The future work lies in two aspects. Firstly, multi-factor trust management model will be further studied, so as to provide exact trust value in complex environments. Secondly, other than nodes' trust level, other parameters, like node density, network geometry can be considered to further improve broadcast efficiency.
